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EU – ASEAN FTA: REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR 
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 




The recent interest shown by the European Union towards the countries in 
South-east Asia, as well as the initiatives for setting up free trade areas in the 
region, come to confirm the uneasiness that portrays the situation at home, as 
well as the efforts that it set out to make in order to maintain its competitiveness 
on a global scale. Particularly, the attention that the EU has given to bi-regional 
cooperation, initiating talks for a free trade area with ASEAN, rather than with its 
member  countries,  strengthens  the  belief  that  the  EU  is  currently  seeking  to 
consolidate its position in South-east Asia and to counter the increasing influence 




For the first time in decades, the EU is facing a strategic challenge in its 
external policies, both in trade relations and on the strategic level. The rises of 
Russia  and  China  as  international  actors  –  with  India  close  behind  –  and  the 
increasing  difficulties  upsetting  the  national  economies  are  creating  a  serious 
threat  to  the  EU‟s  ambition  to  become  the  most  competitive  economy  in  the 
world, capable of making its voice heard on the international arena.  
This situation demanded a far-reaching rethink of the approach the Union 
takes to its external relations. If the EU is to remain a serious global actor, it will 
have to find ways to reconcile the imperative of internal economic revival with 
the need to establish new “bridgeheads” in the “hot” regions of Latin America and 
South-East Asia.   
An  test  of  the  Union‟s  ability  to  meet  the  challenges  of  the  shifting 
international order is taking the form of the EU‟s relationship with the countries in 
Southeast Asia, a region which has recently emerged as an important focus for the 
EU for various reasons and  with  which it opened a series  of negotiations  for 
establishing several agreements, either bilateral, or multilateral.  
These new and ambitious agreements proposed by the EU, focused mainly 
on investment and services, come in the context of the disappointment caused by 
the recent evolution of the Doha round of negotiations. The European Union has 
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openly declared the objective of these agreements, in its strategy Global Europe – 
Competing with the World, defining them as “new competitiveness-driven FTAs 
[...] aiming at the highest possible degree of trade liberalization including far-
reaching liberalization of services and investment”.
6 However, this task in not 
easily achievable, considering the differences between the EU and its partners, not 
only  in  terms  of  economic  development,  but  also  politically,  socially  and 
culturally. Thus, although negotiations are under way, their outcome, if any, is 
still to be identified.  
In this context, the question is not WHETHER a free trade area between the 
EU and the ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations), one of the 
most important actors in the region and a significant trade partner to  EU, but 
WHEN this will take place.  
 
EU – ASEAN current relations  
 
The  European  Union‟s  (EU)  policy  towards  Southeast  Asia  is  largely 
premised on strengthening its economic presence and securing market access and 
investment  opportunities  for  its  corporations  in  an  expanding  Asian  market. 
Securing economic dominance in Asia is perceived as central to maintaining the 
EU‟s leading role in the global market place. 
In its 1994 „Towards a New Asia Strategy‟ policy, the EU argued for a 
greater Asian priority and presence. The EU suggested that “the Union needs as a 
matter of urgency to strengthen its economic presence in Asia in order to maintain 
its leading role in the world economy. The establishment of a strong, coordinated 
presence in the different regions of Asia will allow Europe at the beginning of the 
21st  century  to  ensure  that  its  interests  are  taken  fully  into  account  there”
7. 
However, its approach was based on developing bilateral relations with the Asian 
countries like Japan, China, Korea and India. 
Only in the past few  years, with the launching of the ASEM process  in 
1996,  has  the  EU  sought  to  deal  with  Asia  as  a  region.  There  is  increasing 
recognition of the fact that EU and Asia have to deepen their region-to-region 
dialogue, not least to balance the respective dialogues between the EU and the US 
and Asia and the US. 
The  EU  TREATI  scheme  is  an  example  of  this  trend,  which  comes  to 
complement  ASEAN‟s  own  integration  plans.  This  initiative  is  aimed  at 
increasing the degree of  harmonization between ASEAN member states and at 
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bringing a progressive liberalization of regional trade, which is to culminate in the 
formation of an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. 
Also,  the  EU  offers  financial  support  for  ASEAN‟s  regional  integration. 
There is a certain level of self-interest here: the EU favors trade agreements with 
regional blocs, as this allows EU corporate industry access to larger, integrated 
markets at a single stroke. 
 
Common interests of EU and ASEAN  
 
The EU shares many common features and interests with South East Asia. 
Both are seeking to deepen regional cooperation and integration between highly 
diverse Member States through the EU and ASEAN respectively. Countries from 
both regions cherish the respect for their cultural, religious and linguistic identity. 
Both regions are committed to a multi-polar world based on strong multilateral 
international institutions. 
1. On the political side, the triangle formed by the US, EU and Asia is 
increasingly important in world affairs. Strengthening the EU-Asia side of that 
triangle  would  also  strengthen  the  prospects  for  global  governance  based  on 
multilateral institutions to which both Asia and the EU are strongly committed. 
At the same time the EU and Asia must recognize the shortcomings of the 
multilateral system and seek to promote “effective multilateralism.” This means 
more serious reflection on how to strengthen the UN, the WTO institutions; and 
also  how  to  tackle  the  new  security  threats  caused  by  “failed  states.”
8  This 
requires a frank debate on when to use force to resolve international problems. 
Southeast Asian nations and Europe also share the same security concerns with 
regard to terrorism, drugs and illegal immigration. The EU‟s “soft power” and its 
ability  to  promote  peace  and  security  through  development  aid,  economic 
assistance and non-military security cooperation is increasingly welcome among 
the ASEAN members. 
2.  For  ASEAN,  a  key  priority  remains  how  it  should  deal  with  the 
development  gap  between  its  richer  and  poorer  members  following  the 
enlargement with Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma/Myanmar in the nineties. 
Average per capita income in South East Asia is 1,217 euro: ranging from 215 
euro in Cambodia to 3,900 euro in Malaysia and 23,500 euro in Singapore. The 
enormous disparity between the poorest and the richest ASEAN members places a 
direct restraint on economic and social integration. In this context, financial aid 
from the European Union is more than welcome while taking on the European 
model of integration is an opportunity not to be missed. So far, the EU is the only 
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economic  organization  in  the  world  to  have  social  solidarity  and  economic 
convergence as priority objective 
3.  The  two  regions  also  enjoy  very  strong  commercial  links.  On  trade, 
relations with the EU have increased ten fold since the early 1990s. The EU is 
now ASEAN‟s third largest  trading partner,  accounting for 12.5% of ASEAN 
trade. Significantly, the EU is ASEAN‟s second largest export market after the 
US.  Also  on  investment,  ASEAN  remains  a  preferred  destination  for  EU 
companies, in spite of the  slight decrease in favor of China.  
Table 1. ASEAN major trading partners (left) and export destinations (right) 
 
         Source: DG trade, 2006 
 
ASEAN countries are again displaying impressive growth figures and are 
set to become one of the most dynamic growth engines for the world economy. 
With its growing export-led economies and a fast developing domestic market of 
530 million people, ASEAN is a region of global economic importance that the 
EU cannot afford to neglect, especially at a moment when the trade balance is in 
favor  of  ASEAN.  Surely,  the  establishment  of  a  free  trade  area  would 
significantly  benefit  the  Europeans,  as  seen  in  Figure  1.  Due  to  the  quality 
requirements, property rights and other regulations on which the EU has the upper 
hand, there are enough reasons to believe that once the FTA is established, the 
trade balance will change.   
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Figure 1. EU-25 merchandise trade with the ASEAN 
 
   Source: Eurostat, 2006 
 
Also, the prospect of using the euro more in financial markets and for trade 
has enormous potential. However, there should be noted that there are marked 
regional variations within this overall booming relationship, between the more 
and  less  developed  countries  in  Southeast  Asia.  For  example,  if  referring  to 
investments, the EU FDI flows Singapore attracts more FDI than all the other 
ASEAN countries taken together and was the 4th largest destination for EU direct 
investment in 2003, after Russia and ahead of China. 
4. Cooperation on environment, especially on the Kyoto protocol, has been 
good  but  there  are  many  other  problem  areas  to  be  tackled  together,  such  as 
sustainable natural resource management (e.g. forestry), the management of urban 
development,  and  energy  security.  European  experience  and  technology  is 
advanced in this area and could be of interest to Asian partners.  
5. Migration is an increasingly sensitive issue and Asia is the source of 
potentially significant migratory flows to Europe. The EU and Asian countries 
have started a dialogue on this common challenge in the context of ASEM and are 
beginning to develop common approaches.  
 
Features of an EU-ASEAN FTA 
 
From  the  perspective  of  the  European  Union,  the  two  regions  should 
establish a "deeper" FTA, constituting a reduction of tariffs and elimination of 
non-tariff barriers and technical barriers to trade. If possible, the EU will expand 
the FTA to include investment. Also, it should involve harmonization of trade 
rules  and  regulations  and  WTO-plus  principles,  regulatory  market  access 
restrictions  and  intellectual  property.  The  ASEAN  governments  do  not  want 
government procurement on the negotiation table, contrary to the EU‟s demands. 
The EUs “deeper” FTA roadmap is already in place in the context of the Trans-
Regional  EU-ASEAN  Trade  Initiative  (TREATI),  which  is  a  precursor  to  the 
establishment of a free trade agreement (FTA).   40 
 
ASEAN nations are expected to make such fundamental changes to their 
economy in exchange for European market access. Furthermore, these changes are 
perceived  as  fundamental  requirements  to  entice  investments  and  limited  FDI 
flow  to  the  region.  Also,  it  is  argued  that  these  changes  are  an  absolute 
requirement to  ensure foreign investors  that their investments  are indeed safe, 
certain and predictable. Basic concerns include Standards and Quality Control; 
Intellectual  Property  Rights  and  the  negotiation  of  Mutual  Recognition 
Agreements on standards, testing and certification. 
Concretely, the scope of the ASEAN-EU FTA should inter-alia include the 
following:  
•  The  progressive  and  reciprocal  liberalization  of  trade  in  goods  and 
services,  which  goes  beyond  the  level  of  existing  commitments  in  the  WTO 
within an agreed time frame; 
• The liberalization and facilitation of investment and creation of an open 
and nondiscriminatory environment; 
• The elimination of barriers to trade and the creation of clear, stable and 
transparent rules for exporters, importers and investors. This includes provisions 
which  aim  at  the  facilitation  of  trade  and  as  well  as  provisions  on  standards, 
technical  regulations,  conformity  assessment  procedures,  and  sanitary  and 
phytosanitary measures; 
• Setting up a pragmatic approach for addressing government procurement 
by enhancing transparency, as well as possible improvements in market access 
opportunities on a pluri-lateral basis; 
•  The  adequate  and  effective  protection  and  enforcement  of  intellectual 
property rights; 
• The establishment of an effective mechanism for co-operation in the field 
of competition. 
 
Opportunities for EU and ASEAN 
 
Internationally,  ASEAN  continues  to  compete  with  MERCOSUR  on  the 
agricultural market. Should an EU-MERCOSUR FTA be established, the ASEAN 
would be the only large agricultural region in the world facing EU tariffs in this 
sector. Thus, ASEAN would lose in the absence of an EU-ASEAN FTA. The 
same is true for the EU: if ASEAN concludes an FTA with all other industrialized 
countries, the EU would be the only industrialized region facing tariffs on the 
ASEAN market. Therefore, an FTA between the ASEAN and the EU would not 
only mean more liberalized trade, but also less discrimination between significant 
trade partners. 
The importance of concluding an FTA is magnified by the fact that the EU 
and other industrialized countries compete to provide the same kind of goods and   41 
services, and within the same quality range. Thailand and the Philippines are large 
agricultural exporters. Hence for them, an agreement with the EU becomes crucial 
if the EU were to conclude an agreement with Mercosur. 
Moreover, the Japanese government has recently floated the idea of an East 
Asia Free Trade Agreement. This involves ASEAN member countries including 
Japan, Korea and China, New Zealand, Australia and India. The Agreement will 
be  the  biggest  FTA  in  the  world  involving  as  much  as  two  billion  people, 
providing a reason more for the EU to hurry the negotiations with the ASEAN.  
Various studies
9 commissioned to evaluate the impact of an EU -ASEAN 
FTA  suggested that in 2020 the gains accruing to ASEAN members will be about 
2 % of GDP. However, the g ains for individual member countries would be 
different  with  modest  gains  for  the  Less  Development  Countries,  namely 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Burma. Gains accruing to the EU will be positive. 
The bulk of the gains to ASEAN will come from the liberalization in services. An 
ambitious ASEAN-FTA would lead to a sizeable welfare gains including an 
increase in production and employment.  
Also, several opinions state that an ASEAN -EU FTA serves ASEAN and 
EU  strategically.  The  EU  could  consolidate  its  commercial   presence  of  EU 
transnational corporations in a dynamic and expanding ASEAN. Also, the EU 
would be able to ensure a more stable and predictable environment for the 
protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  and  other  regulatory  requirements. 
ASEAN‟s strategic advantage would be to secure market access and commercial 
presence in Europe. An FTA with the EU could increase FDI attractiveness for 
ASEAN, a prerequisite to compete with China. 
 
EU-ASEAN FTA-related risks 
 
What is obvious in the ASEAN-EU FTA schema is that the ASEAN that 
needs to reform its economy if it wants to do business with Europe. European 
investments  would  find  ASEAN  attractive  only  if  ASEAN  meets  European 
expectations.  In  fact,  the  roadmap  towards  an  FTA  dictates  that  ASEAN 
governments, not withstanding the different stages of growth, commit themselves 
to  embracing  a  development  strategy  that  is  going  to  place  them  and  their 
companies in direct competition with powerful European TNCs. 
 Of course, the EU admits the existing asymmetries and declares itself ready 
to negotiate. However, it requires the ASEAN states to reach a common ground 
level  from  which  negotiations  will  start.  This  kind  of  FTA  certainly  favors 
European  TNCs  with  in-built  advantages  and  are  global  market  leaders  in  a 
variety of sectors by protecting their advantage.  
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The  need  to  adapt  product  design,  re-organize  production  systems,  and 
satisfy multiple testing and certification procedures can entail a significant cost 
(or  technical  trade  barrier)  for  suppliers,  and  this  will  only  affect  ASEAN 
producers, since they are required to catch up with Europe.  
If we take into consideration the other agreements initiated by the EU with 
its commercial partners, like Mexico, setting up a free trade area with ASEAN 
could mean the deepening of the commercial deficit in EU favor.  
When  the  EU-Mexico  Free  Trade  Agreement  (FTA)  came  into  force  in 
2000, the then EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy touted its significance for the 
future  of  Europe‟s  trade  strategy.  It  has  since  served  as  a  model  for  further 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs) between the EU and 
Latin American countries and regions. Seven years on, though, the impact of the 
EU-Mexico FTA is clear. Instead of the promised economic and social benefits, 
the treaty has left the Mexican state unable to implement policies to promote local 
small and medium size companies. Mexico‟s finance sector is now at the mercy of 
EU capital, while across various economic sectors the FTA has worked to the 
benefit of European transnational corporations and to the detriment of Mexican 
industries. The Mexican example is bound to repeat for the ASEAN members,  as 
the partners are significantly different in their development levels.  
In the case of the EU-Mexico FTA, which took effect in 2000, the European 
Commission delegation in Mexico had predicted that Mexican exports to the EU 
would increase from US$4.8 billion in 1999 to $30 billion by 2005. According to 
official data, in the first two years of the agreement, Mexican exports to the EU 
actually was in  fact  negative. Subsequently, Mexican exports did  increase but 
only to $10 billion in 2006, far below the $30 billion predicted by the EU for 
2005. 
Moreover, Mexican imports from the EU grew rapidly, reaching $27 billion 
in 2006. The result was a steadily growing trade deficit, from $9.4 billion in 2000 
to $14.2 billion in 2004 and $16.9 billion in 2006. Thus, that between 2000 and 
2006, Mexico‟s trade deficit with the EU increased by 79.6 percent. 
An FTA with the EU would force the 10 ASEAN members to adjust their 
investment regulations to meet the standards of the EU countries, which he said 
was  inappropriate  in  the  context  of  the  ASEAN  members,  which  had  vastly 
different levels of development.  
Moreover, although foreign investment might rise,  this won‟t necessarily 
mean  a  higher  employment  level,  or  better  wages,  as  investors  count  on  the 
comparative  advantage  of  cheap  labour  force  and  on  the  poor  worker  social 
protection.  
A striking feature of the proposed EU-ASEAN FTA is that it is not – as has 
been  normal  EU  practice  to  date  –  embedded  in  an  association  agreement, 
containing provisions on political, economic and development cooperation along 
with a focus on social cohesion, democratic principles and human rights. The fact   43 
that the EU already maintains or is negotiating partial agreements on political and 
economic cooperation with individual ASEAN countries, and the urgency with 
which the Commission would like to conclude the negotiations (by 2009), has 
evidently  sparked  a  feeling  that  a  cumbersome  negotiating  of  an  umbrella 
agreement  could  be  dispensed  with,  and  separate  FTA  negotiations  launched 
immediately. 
The  EU‟s  willingness  to  sideline  social  and  developmental  issues  in  the 
interest of a swift conclusion of the trade negotiations may be interpreted as a 
reflection of the importance it attaches to the opportunities offered by the ASEAN 
market. Such an approach is fully in line with the policy shift indicated in the 




The  EU-ASEAN  FTA  talks  must  be  seen  against  the  backdrop  of  EU 
concerns that its economic interests in South-East Asia will be sidelined as the 
US, China and Japan are negotiating a widening web of bilateral agreements in 
the  region.  Therefore,  it  is  of  vital  importance  to  the  EU‟s  objectives  to 
consolidate  its  position  as  a  global  player  to  gain  a  foothold  in  this  crucial 
emerging region. 
 
With ASEAN emerging as the world‟s largest exporter by 2050, the EU has 
singled out the region as one of its priority targets. ASEAN is a key market for the 
EU,  as  expectations  are  that  the  world‟s  economic  centre  of  gravity  will 
increasingly shift to the Asia-Pacific region. 
In  a  global  environment  increasingly  populated  by  region-to-region 
agreements,  neither  the  EU,  nor  the  ASEAN  can  afford  to  stand  aside.  The 
establishment of a free trade area would undoubtedly bring economic benefits and 
promote the European model of integration among the ASEAN countries, while it 
would also allow Asian producers an easier access on the European market.  
However,  taking  into  consideration  past  EU  agreements,  there  are  some 
concerns, including the failure to mention asymmetry in the negotiating mandate, 
the EU‟s demands for WTO-plus commitments from developing countries like 
ASEAN  in  total  disregard  of  any  development  dimension  to  trade,  the  real 
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